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Abstract
Background: After the WHO issued the global alert for 2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1), many national health
agencies began to screen travelers on entry in airports, ports and border crossings to try to delay local
transmission.
Methods: We reviewed entry screening policies adopted by different nations and ascertained dates of official
report of the first laboratory-confirmed imported H1N1 case and the first laboratory-confirmed untraceable or ‘local’
H1N1 case.
Results: Implementation of entry screening policies was associated with on average additional 7-12 day delays in
local transmission compared to nations that did not implement entry screening, with lower bounds of 95%
confidence intervals consistent with no additional delays and upper bounds extending to 20-30 day additional
delays.
Conclusions: Entry screening may lead to short-term delays in local transmission of a novel strain of influenza
virus. The resources required for implementation should be balanced against the expected benefits of entry
screening.
Background
Pandemic influenza A (H1N1) virus emerged in Mexico
in early 2009. Rapid global spread was primarily asso-
ciated with air travel [1]. As the World Health Organi-
zation (WHO) raised their pandemic alert level to 4 and
then 5 in April, national health agencies across the
world activated their pandemic plans. Following gui-
dance by WHO, many authorities began to screen trave-
lers on entry in airports, ports and border crossings,
isolate suspected or confirmed cases, and quarantine
their close contacts [2]. Exit screening was not imple-
mented by source nations. Modeling studies suggested
that entry screening could not prevent introduction but
might be able to delay local epidemics by a few weeks
[3-6]. Entry screening and quarantine did not substan-
tially delay introductions in previous pandemics [7]. We
reviewed entry screening policies adopted by different
nations and estimated the range of delays in local epi-
demics associated with entry screening.
Methods
To explore potential delays in local H1N1 transmission
associated with entry screening, we ascertained dates of
official report of the first laboratory-confirmed imported
H1N1 case and the first laboratory-confirmed untrace-
able or ‘local’ H1N1 case (i.e. a case not otherwise epi-
demiologically linked with international travel, contact
with an imported case or their secondary infectees) and
the interval between these two events. We calculated
the additional delays associated with entry screening
tools versus the observed delays in nations that did not
screen. Since the data did not follow a normal distribu-
tion we estimated 95% confidence intervals for these dif-
ferences using bootstrapping, which is a resampling
technique suitable for statistical inference in small sam-
ple sizes with non-normal distributions [8]. We based
each bootstrap confidence interval on 1,000 resamples.
Statistical analyses were conducted using R (R Develop-
ment Core Team, Vienna, Austria) [9].
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22, 2009. The methods of entry screening employed
were identified by review of official national health min-
istry websites and the media, and Google searches in
English using queries of the form (“<country name>”
AND (“influenza” OR “H1N1” OR “swine flu” OR “pan-
demic” OR “Mexican flu”)). We included each nation
that had notified more than 100 confirmed H1N1 cases
to the World Health Organization by July 6, 2009,
except Mexico and the United States where local trans-
mission occurred prior to the WHO global alert. To
determine the date of first imported case and first local
case the search queries were extended accordingly.
Queries were translated by Google language tools http://
www.google.com/language_tools and Babelfish http://
babelfish.yahoo.com to local official languages and
searches were repeated to further increase our scope.
We searched for websites in languages including Chi-
nese, Dutch, French, German, Greek, Hebrew, Japanese,
Korean, Portuguese, Spanish and Thai.
Results
We identified 35 nations that had reported more than
100 confirmed H1N1 cases to the World Health Organi-
zation by July 6 (we included Hong Kong separately
from mainland China as it has separate administration)
(Additional file 1). The date of the first untraceable local
case could not be determine df o r9 / 3 5o ft h en a t i o n s .
Further details and web links to relevant reports and
original data sources are available from the correspond-
ing author on request.
We identified four broad approaches to entry screen-
ing. First, temperature checks were performed onboard
aircraft prior to disembarkation. Second, health declara-
tion forms were collected from every traveler or all tra-
velers from countries identified with confirmed H1N1
cases. Third, arriving travelers were observed by alert
staff for influenza symptoms (e.g. cough). Fourth, trave-
lers were scanned for elevated body temperature by
thermal scanners. In the majority of countries screening
was implemented by May 1, 2009 although we were
unable to determine whether there were any substantial
changes in screening protocols after commencement of
screening but before confirmation of the first local case.
Because of stochasticity (i.e. chance variations in the
occurrence of secondary transmission due to small
number of cases initially), the single observed interval
between the confirmation of the first imported case
and the first local case in a given country is not easily
interpretable. We examined patterns in aggregated
data expecting that errors due to stochasticity should
tend to average out in comparisons between groups of
countries using similar tools. Two nations (China and
Japan) implemented all four tools. Five nations did not
implement any of the four. Table 1 shows the intervals
between confirmations of first imported cases and first
local cases, categorized by entry screening tools. Over-
all, implementation of the four tools alone or in com-
bination were associated with on average additional 7-
12 day delays in local transmission compared to
nations that did not implement entry screening, with
lower bounds of 95% confidence intervals consistent
with no additional delays and upper bounds extending
to 20-30 day additional delays (Table 1). Dates of ill-
ness onset were available for the first imported cases
in 11/26 nations and the first local cases in 4/26
nations, and mean delays were similar in that subset
(data not shown).
Discussion
Our results suggest that entry screening did not lead to
substantial delays in local H1N1 transmission (Table 1).
This empirical study is consistent with theoretical
results from previous modeling studies [3-6] and find-
ings from previous pandemics [7]. While longer delays
in local transmission to the summer in countries in the
Northern hemisphere could have substantially aided
pandemic mitigation, due to seasonal factors [3] and
school vacations [10,11] leading to lower peak attack
rates [12], the observed delays in the present pandemic
Table 1 Use of alternative entry screening approaches and intervals between official confirmation of first imported
pandemic influenza A (H1N1) case and official confirmation of first untraceable local case for 26 nations with more
than 100 confirmed cases by July 6, 2009.
Screening approaches used n (%) Median interval, days
(inter-quartile range)
Mean interval,
days
Mean difference in intervals
compared to no screening (95% CI)*
No screening 5 (19%) 22 (0, 22) 14
1- Medical checks before disembarkation 2 (8%) 21 (14, 28) 21 7 (-14, 30)
2- Health declaration forms 11 (42%) 22 (13, 34) 23 9 (-4, 24)
3- Symptom screening 13 (50%) 33 (7, 41) 26 12 (-2, 27)
4- Thermal scanners 13 (50%) 22 (7, 33) 21 7 (-6, 23)
2 OR 3 OR 4 21 (81%) 22 (7, 35) 23 9 (-3, 22)
2 AND 3 AND 4 6 (23%) 23 (9, 35) 22 7 (-9, 25)
*95% confidence intervals estimated by bootstrapping with 1,000 resamples.
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additional time for preparation and planning.
W h i l eo u rs t u d yf o c u s e do nt h ei m p a c to fe n t r y
screening, some nations also implemented other con-
tainment and mitigation measures, such as isolation of
suspected or confirmed cases, quarantine of their con-
tacts with or without antiviral chemoprophylaxis, school
closures or other social distancing measures, and public
health campaigns to improve hygiene. Most nations
enhanced their influenza surveillance. If countries that
expended greater effort into entry screening also had
more effective containment and mitigation measures in
the general population, these might have led us to over-
estimate the effect of entry screening. Conversely, if
countries that expanded greater effort into entry screen-
ing also tended to have better influenza surveillance and
were able to identify local transmission earlier, we may
have underestimated the effect of entry screening. Other
differences between countries in laboratory capacity and
availability of public health resources may also have
confounded our evaluation, and all of these factors are
limitations of our study.
Previous mathematical modeling studies have ques-
tioned the value of entry screening, since it could only
delay rather than prevent local epidemics [3-6]. How-
ever, most models assumed that source countries would
conduct exit screening and infectious cases would not
travel [3-6]. In such a scenario it is not surprising that
entry screening would add little benefit, since most jour-
neys are shorter than the average 1.5-2 day incubation
period for influenza A virus infections [5,13]. Screening
is unlikely to identify 100% of ill travelers, while some
might use antipyretics to reduce a fever prior to passing
through thermal scanners, or fail to report symptoms on
declaration forms. Many individuals with subclinical or
asymptomatic illness would not be identified, and could
initiate outbreaks after arrival [14]. In Hong Kong, only
one third of confirmed imported H1N1 cases were iden-
tified through screening on entry to Hong Kong, the
majority of imported cases were identified through the
local health care system after arrival (T. Tsang, personal
communication). A similar experience has been reported
in Singapore [15]. Nevertheless, entry screening could
act as a deterrent to traveling when ill or lead to other
indirect benefits such as improving public awareness of
the pandemic.
For entry screening to be successfully employed, sub-
stantial resources are required to identify the small frac-
tion of travelers who may have H1N1 infection [16].
Further resources may be needed to isolate identified
cases, and trace and quarantine close contacts. An
i m p o r t a n tc a v e a ti st h a tad e l a yi ni n e v i t a b l el o c a l
transmission of a pandemic virus may not be desirable if
it would defer local transmission into a season asso-
ciated with higher transmissibility such as the winter in
temperate regions [12], or if it led to importation and
local transmission of antiviral resistant strains [17].
In addition to the caveats on potential confounding by
resource availability, competing interventions, and other
differences discussed above, there are a number of
further limitations to our study. First, identification,
confirmation and notification of H1N1 cases is unlikely
to have been perfect given the mild and self-limiting
nature of most infections, and dates of importation and
local transmission that we report may lag behind the
true events of interest. Nations that devoted greater
resources to entry screening may have identified
imported cases earlier. Secondly, we have not considered
the size of local epidemics, or how the degree of con-
nectivity with source regions (for example the number
of travelers per day) might relate to time delays between
imported and local cases. Thirdly, by focusing on
nations with at least 100 confirmed cases by July 6,
2009 we may have excluded nations where entry screen-
ing was more effective in delaying local transmission, or
excluded some nations with fewer resources available
for surveillance and confirmation of local cases.
Fourthly, while we searched for the dates of reporting of
the first imported case and first local case, these dates
may not have corresponded exactly to the dates of iden-
tification and confirmation of those cases, since in some
cases delays may have occurred for various reasons
including political considerations. Finally, we collected
data from online sources including official government
websites, and we have included the hyperlinks in Addi-
tional file 1, but information available on the internet
could be inaccurate.
Conclusions
In conclusion, our results suggest that entry screening
could delay local transmission for an additional 1-2
weeks. The uncertainty bound of the delay estimates
ranged from no delay to 20-30 days delay. A delay of
1-2 weeks could be useful if the additional time permits
more comprehensive planning and preparation for a
local epidemic, or shortens the time required for other
pandemic mitigation measures such as school closures
to be sustained. However the benefits of local screening
should be balanced against the considerable resources
required to implement screening [14]. Our empirical
results are consistent with the modeling literature, and
support the guidance from the World Health Organiza-
tion that entry screening can only prevent local spread
for a short period of time [14].
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